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THE NEW BANKRUPTCY RULES
Louis W. LEVIT*
INTRODUCTION
On April 24, 1973 the Supreme Court of the United States
issued the new Bankruptcy Rules and Official Forms covering
General Bankruptcy Cases and wage-earner plans (Chapters I to
VII and XIII of the Bankruptcy Act).' These Rules which took
effect on October 1, 1973 reflected more than ten years of pain-
staking endeavor by the Advisory Committee on Bankruptcy
Rules appointed in 1960 by the Chief Justice pursuant to authority
conferred by 28 U.S.C. Section 131, as amended in 1958. The
improvement and modernization of practice in bankruptcy cases
under the Rules promises to be even greater than that effected in
ordinary civil cases through the adoption of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.
Prior practice in bankruptcy procedure was governed primarily
by extensive statutory provisions contained in the various chapters
of the Bankruptcy Act,2 amplified by the General Orders promul-
gated by the Supreme Court 3 pursuant to authority conferred by
former Section 30 of the Act.4 The Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure were applicable only to the extent not inconsistent with either
* Louis W. Levit, admitted to bar, 1947, Illinois; 1957, U.S. Supreme Court. University
of Chicago (B.S., 1943); University of Chicago (J.D., 1946). Associate Editor, Commercial
Law Journal, 1967-. Member: Chicago (Member, 1959- and Chairman, 1966-1967, Bank-
ruptcy Committee; Member, 1964- and Chairman, 1972-1973, Commercial Code Commit-
tee), Illinois State (Chairman of Council, Section of Commercial, Banking and Bankruptcy
Law, 1970-1971), Chairman of Bankruptcy Committee of the Commercial Law League of
America, Commercial Bankrtupcy Committee of the American Bar Association, Federal
and American Bar Associations.
I. Proposed rules covering business reorganizations (Chapters X and XI) are now under
consideration and should be issued shortly. This article will be concerned only with the so-
called "straight bankruptcy" rules.
2. I1 U.S.C. §§ 1-1103 (as amended 1968).
3. Id., § 53 et seq. (hereinafter referred to as the "General Orders").
4. Id., § 53, repealed 1964, Public Laws 88-623.
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the Act or the General Orders.'
Until 1964 the Supreme Court's rule-making powers in Bank-
ruptcy cases were expressly limited to promulgation of rules, forms
and orders consistent with the Act.' In 1964 on the recommenda-
tion of the Advisory Committee, Congress ceded supremacy to the
Court by repealing Section 30 and enacting in its place Section
2075 of the Judicial Code.' Under Section 2075, rules promulgated
by the court, if not expressly rejected by Congress prior to their
effective date, supersede all conflicting statutory provisions, sub-
ject only to the limitation that they neither abridge, enlarge, or
modify any substantive right.'
Accordingly, the new Rules cover, with minor exceptions, the
entire gamut of procedure in ordinary bankruptcy proceedings,
avoiding only matters of substantive right and matters going to the
structure and jurisdiction of the court itself.9 The line of demarca-
tion between substance and procedure is, of course, not easily
drawn, and there are instances where many will conclude that
substantive rights are in fact being affected. 10
Throughout the Rules, one can discern several consistent over-
all themes and objectives." The Court has moved strongly in the
direction of enhancing the judicial nature and authority of the
Referee in Bankruptcy 2 and relieving him of many of the minis-
5. General Order 37; BANKRUPTCY ACT § 21(k) (Hereinafter referred to as the "ACT");
II U.S.C. § 44(k).
6. ACT § 30, 11 U.S.C. § 53 repealed. 1964, Public Laws 88-623.
7. 28 U.S.C. § 2075 (1970).
8. The power of the court to regulate bankruptcy procedure was thus conformed to its
powers in other areas of federal judicial proceedings. Cf Id. § 2072.
9. See Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the
United States, PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED BANKRUPTCY RULES AND OFFICIAL
FORMS (March, 1971) (hereinafter cited PREL. DFT.), Introductory Note XXX, XXXIV.
10. See, e.g., notes 46, 76 and 82 infra, and accompanying text.
I1. See PREL. DFr., Introductory Note, XXVIII-XXXIII.
12. The referee is a judicial officer whose office is created and defined by § 33(ff) of the
Act I I U.S.C. § 61(f). Referees are appointed by the judges of each district for fixed terms
not longer than six years (ACT § 34; 11 U.S.C. § 62). They serve specified territories
designated by the Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts, but
their jurisdiction is co-extensive with that of the respective court or courts by which they
are appointed (ACT § 37: II U.S.C. § 65). Referees are invested generally with power to
enter final orders and make final determinations in all matters referred to them, except in
the rare instances where the Act restricts such jurisdiction to the judge (ACT §§ 1(9), (20),
38: II U.S.C. §§ 1(9), (20), 66). Orders of a referee are final unless reviewed by a judge on
petition (now notice of appeal) iled within ten days after entry (ACT § 39(c); I1
U.S.C. § 67(e)). Under the new Rule 102 all proceedings will, on initiation, be referred to
the referee who will thereafter, with certain minor exceptions, hear all matters in the first
instance. Rule 102, PREL. DFT. 2-3.
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terial burdens to which he is now subjected. Disposition of cases,
particularly no-dividend cases, has been substantially expedited by
curtailing or limiting administrative and procedural requirements.
To the extent feasible, the procedure for contested matters has
been conformed to civil practice under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, and territorial limitations have been relaxed, all to the
end of achieving "a unitary, organic, administration of each bank-
rupt estate to the extent compatible with fairness and justice to
parties in interest and with jurisdictional limitations. '"'3
The discussion which follows will point out some, but by no
means all, of the principal revisions and reforms to be anticipated
in ordinary bankruptcy proceedings under this new procedure.
PART I
PETITION AND PROCEEDINGS RELATING THERETO AND
ADJUDICATION
Part I (Rules 101-121, inclusive) deals with the procedures
leading up to an adjudication in bankruptcy, whether voluntary or
involuntary. 4
Significant changes are introduced in two major areas-the
venue for initiating proceedings, and the hearing of contested invol-
untary cases. Venue is presently controlled by Section 2(a)(1) of
the Act'5 which provides that:
courts of bankruptcy are . . .invested with . . .jurisdiction'
. . .to (1) adjudge persons bankrupt who have had their princi-
pal place of business, resided, or had their domicile within their
respective territorial jurisdictions for the preceding six months,
or for a longer portion of the preceding six months than in any
13. PREL. DFr. Introductory Note, XXXII.
14. A bankruptcy proceeding may be instituted either voluntarily by the debtor, or
involuntarily by its creditors (or in the case of a partnership, by less than all partners). A
voluntary petition need only show that the debtor has debts; adjudication of bankruptcy
follows automatically. An involuntary petition requires a showing that the debtor has
suffered or committed one or more Acts of Bankruptcy within the past four months.
Involuntary petitions may be, but rarely are, contested by the debtors. The more common
course is either to consent to adjudication or to attempt rehabilitation under one of the
debtor-relief chapters of the Act.
15. 11 U.S.C. § ll(a)(l).
16. Although the Act uses the term "jurisdiction", case law has consistently established
that these requirements relate only to venue. Bass v. Hutchins, 417 F.2d 692, 694-95 (5th
Cir. 1969); In re Eatherton, 271 F.2d 199, 201-03 (8th Cir. 1959). Under present law, where
venue is improperly laid, and timely objection is made, the court may in the interest of
creditors either retain the proceeding or transfer it to any other court of bankruptcy without
regard to venue requirements. AcT § 32(c); I I U.S.C. § 55(c).
1973]
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other jurisdiction, or who do not have their principal place of
business, reside, or have their domicile within the United States,
but have property within their jurisdiction, or in any case trans-
ferred to them pursuant to this Act.
Rule 116(a) retains substantially the same criteria for natural
persons, but limits corporate and partnership adjudication-except
in the case of affiliated entities-to the district containing either
the principal place of business or principal assets.' 7
It is in the area of affiliated entities that the most profound
changes are effected. Formerly, the only provision for so-called
"affiliate jurisdiction" in ordinary bankruptcy was in the case of
partnerships. Section 5(d) of the Act"8 provided that "the court
having jurisdiction'" of a general partner may have jurisdiction of
all the general partners and of the administration of the partner-
ship and individual property." The new rules not only retain and
expand the provision as to partnerships,2 but in addition, introduce
a wholly new concept of affiliation among various types of entities.
Rule 901(3) defines an affiliate of a bankrupt as:
(A) a corporation 25 per cent or more of whose outstanding
voting securities are directly or indirectly owned, controlled, or
held with power to vote, by the bankrupt, or (B) a person who
directly or indirectly owns, controls, or holds with power to vote,
25 per cent or more of the outstanding voting securities of the
bankrupt, or (C) a corporation 25 per cent or more of whose
outstanding voting securities are directly or indirectly owned,
controlled, or held with power to vote, by a person who directly
or indirectly owns, controls, or holds with power to vote, 25 per
cent or more of the outstanding voting securities of the bankrupt,
or (D) a person substantially all of whose property is operated
under lease or operating agreement by the bankrupt, or (E) a
person who operates under lease or operating agreement substan-
tially all of the property of the bankrupt.
Rule 116(4) provides succinctly ". . . a petition commencing a
bankruptcy case may be filed by or against an affiliate of the
bankrupt in a district where a petition under the Act by or against
17. This conforms to the present venue requirements for original petitions for corporate
reorganization under Chapter X. Act § 128; 11 U.S.C. § 528.
18. I1 U.S.C. § 23(d) (now superseded by Rule 116(a)(3)).
19. Supra note 15.
20. Rule 116(a)(3) provides that not only the filing of a petition by or against a partner
in a court of appropriate venue, but also the filing of a petition by or against the partnership
confers venue on that Court to administer the estate of all other general partners.
[Vol. 57
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the bankrupt is pending. '21
These affiliation rules are supplemented by Rule 117(b) which
authorizes the court to order joint administration of proceedings
pending in the same court and involving either (1) a husband and
wife, or (2) a partnership and one or more of its general partners,
or (3) two or more general members of a partnership, or (4) a
bankrupt and an affiliate, . . . provided that the court first give
"due consideration to the protection of creditors of the different
estates against potential conflicts of interest."
The combined effect of these rules will be that in most cases
involving related entities, the various estates will be jointly admin-
istered in one court. Although this may create inconvenience or
even hardship in isolated instances, the overall result promises
substantial economies and efficiencies in the administration of re-
lated proceedings.
Substantial innovations are also prescribed for contested invol-
untary proceedings. Procedural requirements relating to service of
process, time for response, types and description of response and
pre-hearing examination are revised to conform, to a much greater
extent, to present federal practice under the Rules of Civil
Procedure.22
Rule 115 prescribes the procedure for the actual hearing of a
contested petition. It preserves the right to jury trial conferred by
Section 19a of the Act,2 but consistent with the express objective
of enhancing the office of the referee, provides that the referee may
conduct such trials unless either the alleged bankrupt demands, or
local rules specify, that the trial be conducted before the district
judge. 24
In accordance with the general objective of the Rules, Rule 121
21. Cf. the far more limited provisions of § 129 of Chapter X (11 U.S.C. § 529) pro-
viding, that, to the effect that if a corporation is a subsidiary, an original petition by or
against it may be filed either as provided in § 128 of the Act or in the Court which has
approved the petition by or against its parent corporation.
22. See Rules 11I, 112, 114 and accompanying Advisory Committee notes.
23. 11 U.S.C. § 42(a) "A person against whom an involuntary petition has been filed
shall be entitled to have a trial by jury in respect to the question of his insolvency. . . and
of any acts of bankruptcy alleged in such petition to have been committed."
24. Rule 115(b)(l) Neither the Act nor the General Orders ever contained any provision
precluding jury trials before referees, but the Judicial Conference, in response to an inquiry
from Senator Eastland in 1960, express the opinion that only judges should preside at jury
trials of involuntary petitions in bankruptcy. The new rule is apparently the result of a
compromise between those members of the Advisory Committee who desired to grant full
authority to the referees to hear jury trials and those who wished to retain the former
prohibition.
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makes applicable to all proceedings relating to contested adjudica-
tions the major portion of the so-called adversary proceedings rules
of Part VII2 which in turn, are adaptations of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure designed specifically for use in the hearing of
most contested matters within a bankruptcy proceeding.
PART II
ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS
Part II of the new Rules, notwithstanding its seemingly innocu-
ous and ministerial subject matter, contains some of the most
controversial provisions, and deals with some of the perplexing
problems of bankruptcy practice.
A. Solicitation of Proxies
The one Rule which has undoubtedly engendered the most
comment and debate is Rule 208 covering solicitation and voting
of proxies. The background and purpose of this Rule is summa-
rized by the Advisory Committee as follows: 6
Creditor control is a basic feature of the Act. Creditor participa-
tion in administration is facilitated by the definition of "credi-
tor" in the Act (Section 1(11)) to include the duly authorized
agent, attorney, or proxy of the owner of a provable claim. Cred-
itor democracy is perverted and the congressional objective frus-
trated, however, if control of administration falls into the hands
of persons whose principal interest is not in what the estate can
be made to yield to the unsecured creditors but in what it can
yield to those involved in its administration or in other ulterior
objectives.
To prevent such abuse of creditor control, Rule 208 imposes
strict curbs on the solicitation and use of proxies n in bankruptcy
proceedings. Solicitation of proxies is defined as:
any communication other than one from an attorney to a regular
client who owns a claim or from an attorney to the owner of a
claim who has requested the attorney to represent him, by which
a creditor is asked, directly or indirectly, to give a proxy after
25. Rules 701 to 782 inclusive. See discussion notes 111-130 infra, and accompanying
text.
26. Advisory Committee Note to Rule 208.
27. A "proxy" is defined to "include a power of attorney, proof of claim, or other
writing authorizing any person who does not then own a claim to vote the claim or otherwise
act as the owner's attorney in fact in connection with the administration of an estate in
bankruptcy. Rule 208 (a)(1).
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or in contemplation of the filing of a petition by or against the
bankrupt." (Emphasis Added)
Such solicitation of proxies is absolutely prohibited except by
the following prescribed persons or organizations:
1. A creditor owning a provable claim on the date of the filing
of the petition; 9
2. A committee of creditors elected at a regularly scheduled
meeting of creditors in court,30 or selected at an out-of-court meet-
ing at which all creditors holding claims over $500 or the 100
creditors having the largest claims had at least five days notice in
writing and of which written minutes were kept reporting all perti-
nent details of the meeting.3'
3. A bona fide trade or credit association from creditors who
were members or subscribers in good standing and owners of prov-
able claims on the date of bankruptcy. 3
All solicitations must be in writing33 and may not be made in
any interest other than that of general creditors; or by or on behalf
of any receiver, trustee, assignee for benefit of creditors, or attor-
ney at law or creditor disqualified from voting, or transferee of a
claim for collection only.34
Holders of more than one proxy must, before the voting comm-
ences at any meeting, file a verified list of proxies to be voted and,
with respect to proxies that have been solicited, detailed statements
as to the solicitation, execution and delivery of the proxies and
express disavowal that any consideration has been paid or prom-
ised therefor. These statemements must also include detailed veri-
fied statements as to whether there is any agreement which may
have been made by the holder, solicitor or forwarder of the proxy
with respect to sharing of compensation, or with respect to the
employment of any person as attorney, accountant, appraiser, auc-
tioneer, or other employee for the estate.35
28. Rule 208(a)(2).
29. Rule 208(b)(1)(A).
30. Rules 208(b)(1); 214.
31. Rule 208(b)(1)(c).
32. Rule 208(b)(l)(D).
33. Rule 208(b)(2). This requirement seems unduly harsh and almost impossible to
enforce. It is obviously tied in with the provisions of Rule 208(d)(2), infra, requiring a copy
of the written solicitation to be included in the detailed statement required from voters of
multiple proxies.
34. Rule 208(c).
35. Rule 208(d).
19731
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If any proxy is determined to have been obtained or voted in
violation of the Rule or in other improper manner, the court may
either reject the proxy, vacate any election or other order effected
through its use or take further appropriate action."
B. Selection of Receivers and Trustees
Closely allied to the regulation of proxy solicitaton is the mat-
ter of election and compensation of officers of administration-the
receiver, trustee and their attorneys and accountants. Existing reg-
ulations are strengthened and expanded under the new Rules. Re-
ceivers may be appointed only on application of a party in interest
showing the specific facts necessitating the appointment. 7 A new
provision permits the appointment of a receiver even after the first
meeting of creditors to represent the estate in a contested or adver-
sary proceeding when no trustee has qualified or when the interest
of the trustee may be adverse to that of the estate. 8
Selection and qualification of trustees is largely unchanged by
the new Rules. Creditors entitled to vote under Rules 20711 and
20840 are entitled to elect the trustee at the first meeting"' subject
to the approval of the court." The creditors' selection may be
disapproved for ineligibility43 or other good cause.4
Formerly, a vacancy in office, whether arising by death or
disability, or upon reopening a closed proceeding, could be filled
only by election at a special meeting of creditors called for that
purpose. 5 The new Rules, for unexplained reasons, have disfran-
chised the creditors in these instances and authorize immediate
36. Rule 208(e).
37. Rule 201(b). This rule is designed to eliminate the practice formerly prevailing in
many areas of automatically subjecting every estate to the expense of a receiver and his
counsel who served only during the short period from the initiation of the proceeding until
the trustee was elected at the first meeting of creditors. Also, if the debtor has not yet been
adjudged bankrupt (and thus is still vested with title to his property) he is entitled to notice
and an opportunity to be heard in opposition to the application-Rule 201(c), supra.
38. Rule 201(a).
39. See discussion, infra.
40. See discussion, infra.
41. Rule 204.
42. Rule 209.
43. Eligibility requirements are specified by Rule 209(d) PREL. DFr. 79.
44. Personal preference of the court for another candidate, even when justified, does
not, of course, constitute "good cause", either under former law, or the new Rules. At-
tempts by courts to impose their personal choice on the creditors nevertheless persist. See
e.g., In re Lenrich Sales Inc., 369 F.2d 439 (3 Cir. 1967); In re Thomas, 263 F.2d 287 (7
Cir. 1959).
45. AcT § 44; 11 U.S.C. § 72.
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appointment of the successor by the court." The Rules continue the
statutory provision47 for appointment by the court when the credi-
tors fail to elect, or when the elected trustee either fails to qualify
or is disapproved."
Where joint administration is ordered pursuant to Rule 117(b)"9
the court may appoint or approve election of a single trustee to
administer the joint estate, provided the court is satisfied that the
creditors of the individual estates will not be prejudiced by a con-
flict of the trustee's interests." In the case of partnerships, the
Rules continue the substance of the Act5' to the effect that the
partnership trustee must serve as trustee of each individual estate
except where the court, for cause shown, either permits election of,
or appoints, a separate trustee.52
Eligibility of creditors to vote in elections is only slightly differ-
ent from former practice. The minimum amount (for purpose of
majority in number) is raised from $50 to $10013 and persons con-
trolling partnerships or having interests materially adverse to the
estate are added to the claims of creditors excluded from voting.54
C. Attorneys and Accountants
Employment of attorneys and accountants is regulated by Rule
215, which, in substance, adopts the standard of disinterestedness
and necessity of employment formerly prescribed for attorneys
alone by General Order 44.55 Engagement of an attorney or ac-
countant as a salaried employee is permitted without special au-
thorization in the course of operation of a business. 6 Partners or
regular associates may act on behalf of a duly employed attorney
or accountant.57 The authorization of a trustee or receiver to act
as his own attorney or accountant is specifically permitted when
in the best interest of the estate.51
46. Rule 209(b)(3) and (4). Query, whether this curtailment of voting rights could not
be considered an "abridgement of substantive rights."
47. AcT § 44; 11 U.S.C. § 72.
48. Rule 209(b)(1), (2) and (4).
49. See discussion of Rule 117(b), supra.
50. Rule 210(a)-(d) inclusive.
51. AcT § 5(c); 11 U.S.C. § 32(c).
52. Rule 210(e).
53. Rule 207(b).
54. Rule 209(d).
55. 11 U.S.C. § 53 et seq.
56. Rule 215(d).
57. Rule 215(0.
58. Rule 215(e). This conforms to prevailing decisions. See, e.g., In re Hamilton Dis-
1973]
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Application for, and allowance of compensation of all officers
of the estate-trustees, receivers, marshals," attorneys and ac-
countants is covered by Rule 219. All applicants are required to
disclose all payments made or promised from any source, as well
as all agreements with respect to sharing of compensation-except
those within a firm of lawyers or accountants."0 Attorneys for
bankrupts and petitioning creditors may share compensation with
attorneys contributing to the services rendered, but not with a mere
forwarding attorney.6'
Attorneys for bankrupts are subject to further stringent regula-
tion insofar as compensation is concerned. They are required to
disclose all compensatory arrangements from any source regard-
less of whether they seek compensation from the estate.62 Any
payment made or promised by the bankrupt may be examined by
the court and, to the extent deemed excessive, may be avoided or
recovered. 3
D. Notices to Creditors
Rule 203 prescribes the time and manner of notice to be given
to creditors. Sub-paragraph (b) contains a new provision authoriz-
ing the court to include, where appropriate, in the notice of first
meeting a statement to the effect that since there are no assets from
which a dividend can be paid, it is not necessary to file claims. The
notice should further state that if and when sufficient assets be-
come available for payment of a dividend, creditors will be given
further notice and ample opportunity to file their claims.64 This
rule should eliminate the tremendous amount of time and clerical
service now devoted to filing, and docketing of claims in no-asset
cases.
tributors, Inc., 440 F.2d 1178 (7th Cir. 1971); In re Mabson Lbr. Co., 394 F.2d 23, 24 N.3
(2d Cir. 1968).
59. On rare occasions a U.S. Marshal may act as a receiver. Rule 202 Cf ACT § 2(a)(3),
(5): III U.S.C. § I 1(a)(3), (5).
60. Rule 219(a).
61. Rule 219(d). The provision of the Act which authorized division with forwarding
attorneys (§ 62(c); I I U.S.C. 102(c)) was expressly excluded because of its obvious inconsis-
tency with the Canon 34 of the Canons of Professional Ethics and Disciplinary Rule 2-107
of the Code of Professional Responsibility adopted by the American Bar Association.
Advisory Committee Note, Rule 215.
62. Rule 219(b).
63. Rule 220.
64. Rule 203(b). See discussion of Rule 302, accompanying note 68 infra.
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E. Examinations
A final significant area covered in Part II is the all important
subject of examinations. Rule 205 restates, in substance, the pres-
ent provisions of Sections 7(a)(10), 21(a) and (b) and 55(b) of the
Act.65 The only differences are the elimination of the provision for
examination before state court judges and the relaxation of terri-
torial limits."6 As under former law, the examination may relate
to the acts, conduct or property of the bankrupt, or to any matter
which may affect the administration of the bankrupt's estate, or
his right to discharge. 7
PART III
CLAIMS AND DISTRIBUTION TO CREDITORS
Rules 301 to 310 which deal with proofs of claim and distribu-
tion to creditors are largely declaratory of existing law. Two inno-
vations have been adopted which should expedite existing practice
and avoid potential inequities.
Where notice of no dividend has been given under Rule 203(b) 6
and a dividend subsequently becomes available, creditors may file
claims within 60 days after receiving notice to that effect, or six
months after the first meeting of creditors, whichever is later."
If a tax or wage creditor fails to file a proof of claim on or
before the date of the first meeting of creditors, the bankrupt may
execute and file proof of claim in the creditor's name.7 This per-
mits a discharged bankrupt to protect himself from liability for
payment of a non-dischargeable tax or wage claim which would
have been fully or partially paid from the estate, if the taxing body
had not failed to file its claim.
PART IV
THE BANKRUPT-DUTIES AND BENEFITS
Rules 401 to 409 deal with those aspects of the bankruptcy
65. II U.S.C. 25(a)(1); 44 (a), (b); 71(b).
66. Formerly, a person other than the bankrupt could not be required to attend more
than 100 miles from his residence. Act § 41(a); It U.S.C. § 69(a). Subpoenas are now
governed by Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and thus may be served any place
within the district and any place outside the district within 100 miles of the place of hearing
or trial.
67. Rule 205(d) Cf. In re Foerst, 93 Fed. 190, 191 (S.D.N.Y. 1899); 2 COLLIER ON
BANKRUPTCY 21.05, at 277 (14th ed. 1971) [Hereinafter cited as COLLIER.]
68. See discussion, supra, note 64 and accompanying text.
69. Rule 302(e)(4).
70. Rule 303.
19731
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proceeding most important to the individual bankrupt-the dis-
charge of indebtedness and the setting apart of exemptions. By and
large the rules tend to continue the trend toward expanding the
protection given the debtor by the Act.7
Rule 401 introduces a wholly new concept to straight bank-
ruptcy proceedings. Formerly, creditors were not precluded from
prosecuting claims against the bankrupt unless and until the court,
on application of a party in interest, issued a restraining order.72
Under Rule 401, however, the initiation of a proceeding automati-
cally stays any action and all enforcement proceedings, then pend-
ing or subsequently commenced, so long as the debt is provable and
not excepted from discharge under Section 17(a)(1), (5), (6) or (7)
of the Act. The stay continues until annulled or modified on appli-
cation or a creditor showing cause therefor, or until the case is
either dismissed, or discharge is denied, or waived.
The procedure with respect to exemptions is prescribed by Rule
403. The bankrupt claims his exemptions in the first instance by
making appropriate entry in his schedules.73 Within 15 days after
qualification the trustee must report on the amounts allowed and
disallowed.74 If no objections are filed, the court approves the trus-
tee's report as filed. 75 If objections are filed by the bankrupt or by
any creditor the matter is then heard and determined by the court.
The burden of proof is on the party objecting to the report.76
Rule 403(f) codifies the existing case law which permits a
71. For example, in 1970, Congress substantially amended the Act to grant to the
bankruptcy court virtually exclusive jurisdiction to determine whether any particular debt
is or is not dischargeable under Section 17 of the Act (II U.S.C. § 35). Formerly, the court
had such jurisdiction only under special and unusual circumstances. Local Loan v. Hunt,
292 U.S. 234, 241-2 (1933). For an excellent discussion of the background and effect of the
1970 amendment, see Countryman, The New Dischargeability Law, 45 AM. BANKR. L. J.
1 (1971).
72. Except that the Act does provide for a stay from the limited period from the filing
of the initial petition to adjudication or dismissal. AcT § 11 (a); 11 U.S.C. § 29(a).
73. Rule 403(a).
74. Rule 403(b). If no trustee qualifies, the bankruptcy judge (See note 91, infra) pre-
pares the report; if the bankrupt objects, the court will then appoint a trustee or receiver.
Rule 403(d).
75. Rule 403(e). Query, where the trustee's report recommends disallowance of any or
all of the exemptions claimed by the bankrupt, why should it be necessary for the bankrupt
to then file objections which will merely restate his original claim?
76. This burden of proof provision can be questioned on two grounds. First, even though
probably consistent with former case law, is it really appropriate to place the burden on
the objecting party in all instances whether he be the bankrupt or a creditor? Second, is
this really a procedural matter? Does not the imposition of the burden of proof really
venture into the area of substantive law?
[Vol. 57
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spouse, dependent children or other persons similarly situated to
claim exemption when by virtue of death or other reason the bank-
rupt fails to do so.77
Rules 404-408, inclusive cover the all-important matter of dis-
charge. 7 The procedure for hearing and determination of objec-
tions to discharge as well as the general effect of the discharge
order are spelled out by Rule 404 which is largely declaratory of
former procedure. The objection to discharge is, however, now
designated a complaint and the proceedings are "adversary" and
thus governed by Part VII.
One significant departure from present practice is the elimina-
tion of the requirement that corporate bankrupts must affirma-
tively apply for a discharge. All bankrupts who pay their filing fees
will now be entitled to discharge unless expressly 7 or impliedly
waived" or unless objections are filed and sustained."
The burden of proof in discharge cases8 2 is somewhat modified.
Rule 408 provides that the plaintiff (objecting creditor) "has the
burden of proving the facts essential to his objection". Section
14(c) of the Act83 provided that:
If, upon the hearing of an objection to a discharge, the objector
shall show to the satisfaction of the court that there are reason-
able grounds for believing that the bankrupt has committed any
of the acts which, under this subdivision (c), would prevent his
discharge in bankruptcy, then the burden of proving that he has
not committed any of such acts shall be upon the bankrupt.
77. See, e.g., In re Youngstrom, 153 F. 98 (8th Cir. 1907); In re Edelman, 172 F. Supp.
200, 202 (E.D.N.Y. 1959); In re Maxson, 170 F. 356 (N.D. Iowa 1909); In re Luby, 155 F.
659 (S.D. Ohio 1907).
78. The discharge is the order whereby the bankruptcy court discharges the honest
bankrupt of all his provable debts except those specifically excepted from the operation of
the discharge under § 17 of the Act (11 U.S.C. § 35). Every bankrupt is entitled to the
entry of an order of discharge unless:
a. Specific objection is made to the court by a party in interest who alleges and
established to the satisfaction of the court that the bankrupt has committed one or
more of the offenses specified by Section 14(c) of the Act (11 U.S.C. § 32(c)), or
b. The bankrupt has failed to pay the required filing fee. Under the 1970 amend-
ments to Sections 14 and 17 jurisdiction is granted to the bankruptcy court, not only
to determine whether to grant the discharge, but also, with minor exceptions, which
debts are affected by the discharge. See note 71 supra, and authorities there cited.
79. See Rule 405.
80. See Rule 406.
81. Rule 404(d). See also Advisory Committee Note to Rule 405.
82. Here again, we have a possible encroachment on substantive law. See note 10, supra.
83. 11 U.S.C. § 32(c).
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This is generally construed to require the objector to make out
a prima facie case.84 The rule would impose only "the initial burden
of producing evidence and the ultimate burden of persuasion" and
"leaves to the courts the formulation of rules governing the shift
of the burden of going forward with the evidence.""
Rule 409 prescribes the procedure for determining dischargea-
bility under the 1970 amendments." The principal departures from
present practice are three-fold. First, hearings on dischargeability,
like hearings on discharge itself, are designated as adversary pro-
ceedings, and thus governed by the Rules of Part VII.87 Next,
special provisions are made for shortening the usual time periods
in those cases where the court gives notice of no dividend under
Rule 203(b). 88 Finally, sub-paragraph (c) provides that where a jury
trial is demanded, the trial of the dischargeability issue must be
placed on the jury calendar of the district court, unless: (1) the
bankruptcy judge88 determines that the issue is not triable of right
by a jury," or (2) a local rule of court provides otherwise. Thus,
unlike the situations under Rule 115(b), 1 the referee in a hearing
on dischargeability may preside over a jury trial only where specifi-
cally authorized by local rule.
PART V
DUTIES OF OFFICERS AND PERSONNEL OF BANKRUPTCY COURTS
Consistent with the general objective of the Rules" there are
several provisions in Part V13 which tend to upgrade the referee
as a judicial officer. For example, Rule 506 promises to relieve the
84. See In re Pioch, 235 F.2d 903, 905 (3d Cir. 1956) and other cases cited in Advisory
Committee Note to Rule 407.
85. Advisory Committee Note to Rule 407.
86. See notes 71 and 78 supra.
87. Rules 409(d), 701.
88. Rule 409(a)(2). See notes 64 and 68, supra, and accompanying text.
89. The term "bankruptcy judge" is used in the new rules to denote "the referee of the
court of bankruptcy in which a bankruptcy case is pending, or the district judge of that court
when issuing an injunction under § 2(a)(15) of the Act and when acting in lieu of a referee
under § 43(c) of the Act or under Rule 102." Rule 901(7).
90. The weight of authority now holds that there is no right of jury trial on the issue of
dischargeability itself, but only as to the merits of a claim after it has been determined to
be nondischargeable. See In re Swope, - F.2d -, CCH BKPTCY. SERV. 9] 64, 562 (7th
Cir. 1972), Countryman, supra, n.71 p. 35(f). But see Herzog, Case for Jury Trials on
the Issue of Dischargeability, 46 AM. BANK. L.J. 235 (1971); In re Law Research, Inc., CCH
BKPTcY. SERV. 64, 526 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
91. See note 24, supra and accompanying text.
92. See notes 11 and 12, supra, and accompanying text.
93. Rules 501 to 515, inclusive.
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referee from the great mass of administrative detail presently im-
posed upon him by authorizing him to "delegate any ministerial
function to an assistant employed in his office, or with the approval
of the chief judge of the district court" to any person employed in
the office of the clerk of the district court. Similarly, Rule 512
grants to the referees in each district the authority formerly re-
served to the judges94 to designate banking institutions as deposito-
ries for the funds of estates.
The dignity and judicial nature of the referee and his court
should be further enhanced by Rule 511 requiring a verbatim re-
cord of all proceedings wherever practicable. The record may be
taken either by electronic sound recording or by a shorthand re-
porter employed With authorization of the court.25
Rule 515 deals with reopening estates. It removes doubts and
uncertainties which have heretofore existed in two areas." First, it
states explicitly that estates may be opened in order to accord relief
to the bankrupt as well as to administer assets. Second, it specifies
clearly that application to reopen shall be filed with the clerk of
the district court, who shall thereupon forthwith refer the applica-
tion to the referee for further proceedings.
A particularly salutory rule will reduce the serious injustices
that sometimes result from inadvertent filing in the wrong office.
Rule 509(c) provides that:
(c) Error in Filing.-A paper intended to be filed but erro-
neously delivered to the trustee or receiver, or the attorney for
either of them, or to the district judge, referee, or clerk of the
district court, shall, after the date of its receipt has been noted
thereon, be transmitted forthwith to the proper person. In the
interest of justice, the court may order that the paper shall be
deemed filed as of the date of its original delivery.
PART VI
COLLECTION AND LIQUIDATION OF THE ESTATE
The concept of the automatic stay applied to personal actions
against bankrupts under Rule 401 is extended by Rule 601(a) to
proceedings for the enforcement of any lien against property in the
94. AcT§ 61; 11 U.S.C. § 301.
95. Rule 511(a).
96. See Advisory Committee note to Rule 515 and authorities therein cited.
97. The original draft of the rule (PREL. Dinr. 158-159 ) provided that in every such case
the paper should automatically be deemed filed as of the date of the delivery. It is difficult
to understand why the final revision made the retroactive filing only discretionary.
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custody of the bankruptcy court, or any lien obtained within four
months before bankruptcy by attachment, judgment, levy or other
means.
98
Unless terminated, annulled or modified by court order, the
stay remains in effect until the end of the proceeding or until the
property affected is set apart as exempt, abandoned or trans-
ferred.19
To obtain relief from a stay under Rule 601, as under Rule 401,
it is necessary to file a formal complaint initiating an adversary
proceeding.' Once the complaint is filed, however, the party seek-
ing to continue the stay has the burden of establishing that he is
entitled to it.' 0'
Ex parte relief from a stay may be granted only on (1) a show-
ing that immediate irreparable injury, loss, or damage is imminent,
and (2) a certification of the efforts to give notice and the reasons
why notice should not be required."0 '
Rule 602(b) contains a new provision requiring the receiver or
trustee to give notice of the proceeding to every bank, building and
loan association, utility company, landlord, insurance company or
other person known to be holding the bankrupts money or other
property subject to withdrawal or order of the bankrupt. This is,
of course, designed to limit the possibilities of moneys being inad-
vertently paid the bankrupt rather than the receiver or trustee."0 3
Although the Advisory Committee note indicates that failure to
give the notice will not exempt a transfer from challenge under
Section 70(d), nothing in the Rule itself tends to support this
conclusion.
Rule 606 deals with the all-important subject of appraisal and
sale of the property of the estate. Appraisal-which a literal read-
ing of present Section 70f of the Act'04 requires in every in-
stance-may be waived where the court so directs." 5 All sales must
98. There is serious question whether this automatic stay or the stay under Rule 401
affects either the Federal or State Governments in view of the general rule that governmen-
tal agencies must be specifically named in order to be subject to a restraining order. See,
e.g., U.S. v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 272-3, (1946).
99. Rule 601(b), PREL. DFT. 170.
100. See Rule 701 and related discussion, infra.
101. Rule 601(c).
102. Rule 601(d), PREL. DFT. 171.
103. See Acr § 70(d)(2); II U.S.C. § l10(d)(2), also Bank of Marin v. England, 385
U.S. 99 (1966).
104. II U.S.C. 110(0.
105. Rule 606(a). This is consistent with case law and actual practice. See Robertson
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be subject to court approval, unless the court specifically orders
otherwise." 6 The rule continues the policy17 of requiring sales at
public auction except where good cause is shown on written
application. '11
One of the inherent and essential powers of a court of bank-
ruptcy is its authority to sell encumbered property free and clear
of liens and encumbrances. The court may order such a sale only
when the property is in the actual or constructive possession of the
court, and when there is a reasonable possibility of realizing an
equity for the estate."' Recognizing the basic, inherent adversary
nature of any such sale, the rules provide that an application for
sale free of liens or security interest shall be deemed an adversary
proceeding and be governed by the procedural rules set forth in
Part VII. °10
PART VII
ADVERSARY PROCEEDINGS
Part VII"' contains the detailed procedural rules for most of
the contested matters which will be litigated within the bankruptcy
proceeding.112 Pursuant to Rule 701 the Part VII rules apply to any
proceedings before a bankruptcy judge"1 to:
(1) recover money or property, (2) determine the validity, prior-
v. Howard, 229 U.S. 54, 64 (1913); Bragg v. Gerstel, 148 F.2d 757, 760 (5th Cir. 1945), 4
A COLLIER at 1122, n.5.
106. Rule 606(b)(1); PREL. Dir. 182. Presumably the court would "order otherwise"
only after fixing an upset price. See Advisory Committee Note, supra 183-184. Better
practice should dictate that the sale be subject to court approval in all but the most extreme
cases of rapidly perishable or highly burdensome property.
107. General Order 18, 11 U.S.C. § 53 et seq.
108. Rule 606(b)(2).
109. See 4A COLLIER 70.99, and cases there cited.
110. Rules 606(b)(3), 701. The application of the Part VII rules will undoubtedly tend
to delay the sale of encumbered assets in most cases, thus increasing expenses of administra-
tion, and frequently reducing the amount ultimately realized. It is debatable whether the
protection afforded by the more formalized procedure is sufficient to justify the economic
disadvantages.
11. Rules 701-782, inclusive.
112. As a general rule the bankruptcy court has exclusive, summary jurisdiction, to hear
and determine controversies pertaining to property within the actual or constructive posses-
sion of the trustee. AcT § 23; 11 U.S.C. § 46. Where the controversy concerns property
outside the possession or control of the trustee and where the adverse party does not consent
to summary jurisdiction, it is usually necessary to institute plenary proceedings in a State
or Federal Court of competent jurisdiction. Acr §§ 2(a)(7), 23; 11 U.S.C. §§ 1 1(a)(7), 46;
2 COLLIER 23.01-08 at 433-550.
113. See note 89, supra.
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ity or extent of a lien or other interest for which the holder can
be compelled to take a money satisfaction, (3) sell property free
of a lien or other interest for which the holder can be compelled
to take a money satisfaction, (4) object to or revoke a discharge,
(5) obtain an injunction, (6) obtain relief from a stay as provided
in Rule 401 or 601, (7) avoid an obligation [for fees of a bank-
rupt's attorney] under Rule 220, or (8) determine the dischargea-
bility of a debt,
all of which are designated as "adversary proceedings". In addi-
tion, the Part VII rules apply to a limited extent to all other
contested proceedings which arise within the bankruptcy case."4
The express objective of Part VII is to apply the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, with a minimum of necessary departures, to all
adversary proceedings. The Rules are theriefore not numbered con-
secutively, but rather are correlated with the numbering of the
Civil Procedure Rules. Many of the Rules in Part VII do nothing
more than expressly provide for the applicability of their Civil
Procedure counterparts." 5
The principal departures from civil practice are in connection
with service of process and setting dates for trials. As in civil
cases' the adversary proceeding is commenced by filing a com-
plaint.117 Immediately on filing, the court will set a trial date and
issue summons and notice of trial."18
In addition to personal service"9 and other methods allowed
under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,' service may be made
by mail,' and in some instances by publication.'
Mail service may be made on any defendant by any form of
mail requiring a signed receipt. Specific directions for the place of
service of each type of entity are set forth in subparagraph (1)
through (8) of Rule 704(c). Proof of service by mail must include
114. Rule 914 makes Rules 721, 725, 726, 728-737, 741, 742, 744.1, 752, 754-756, 769
and 771 applicable to all contested matters not otherwise governed by the rules, unless the
court otherwise directs. In addition Rule 121 discussed supra, provides that Rules 705, 708-
710, 715, 716, 724-726, 728-737, 744.1, 756 and 762 shall, unless otherwise directed, apply
to contested adjudications and proceedings to vacate an adjudication.
115. Rule 716 e.g., succinctly states that "Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure applies in adversary proceedings."
116. See FED. R. Civ. P. 3.
117. Rule 703.
118. Rule 704(a).
119. Rule 704(b).
120. Rule 704(d)(1); FED. R. Civ. P. 4(e).
121. Rule 704(c).
122. Rule 704(d)(2).
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the signed receipt or other satisfactory proof that delivery was
actually made to, or else was refused by, the addressee.'m
Where service cannot be effected either personally, by mail, or
by the prescribed alternate means, and where the proceeding is
designed to determine or protect rights in the custody of the court,
service may be made, with court approval, by mailing the papers
to the party's last known address and by at least one publication
in the manner and form directed by the court.2 4
Unlike the corresponding Civil Procedure Rule, Rule 704(e)
contains strict time requirements. Personal service must be made
within three days after issuance of summons. When the service is
made by mail, the papers to be served must be deposited in the mail
within the three day period. In all other cases the time is fixed by
the court.
Perhaps the most important departure from civil practice is
found in Rule 704(f) which authorizes service of all process, other
than a subpoena,'2 anywhere within the United States. Service
may also be made in a foreign country in those cases where domes-
tic service is not essential to the court's jurisdiction.'
The time for response is 25 days from issuance of the summons,
not from service, and may be varied by court order.'2 The objective
is to permit trial to be set, in most cases, no later than 30 days after
filing of the complaint. 2 8
Rule 713 excuses a party sued by a trustee or receiver from the
mandatory counterclaim requirements of Civil Procedure Rule 13.
An interesting and highly desirable provision is Rule 782 which,
unlike all the other Part VII rules, has no counterpart in either
present banking practice or in the Rules of Civil Procedure.," On
notice and hearing, any adversary proceeding may, in the interest
of justice and for the convenience of justice, be transferred to any
other district, whereupon it shall be referred to a referee of that
district and proceed as if originally filed therein. Heretofore trans-
123. Rule 704(g).
124. Rule 704(d)(2); PREL. DFr. 198.
125. A subpoena may still be served only within the limits prescribed by Rule 45. Rule
916. The reasons for this distinction are not at all clear. The Rules could well have author-
ized nationwide service of subpoenas, along with all other process, along with provision for
adequate reimbursement for time and expenses of witnesses.
126. See Advisory Committee Note to Rule 704(f)(2) and authorities therein cited.
127. Rule 712.
128. Advisory Committee Notes to Rules 704(a) and 712.
129. See however 28 U.S.C. §§ 1404, 1406 providing for transfer of civil cases in appro-
priate circumstances.
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fers of bankruptcy proceedings could only be effected by a transfer
of the entire case under Sections 32(b) and (c) of the Act.'
PART VIII
APPEAL TO THE DISTRICT COURT
Part VIII13' governs the procedure for appeals from the referee
to the district judge. Both in the definition and prescription of the
mechanics of appeal, and in the elimination of the archaic nomen-
clature associated with "petitions for review" the new Rules pro-
vide a vast improvement over former statutory and case law.
Formerly, appeals from a referee were designated "petitions
for review" and were controlled by Section 39(c) of the Act. 32 The
petition was required to be filed with the referee within ten days
after the entry of the order appealed from,or within such further
time as the court on petition filed within the ten day period, would
allow. Both the order complained of and the alleged errors in
respect thereto, had to be set forth in the petition. The referee was
then required to certify the petition "promptly" to the clerk of the
court,'3 3 but no specific time limit was prescribed, and no satis-
factory procedure was provided for enforcement if the referee ei-
ther failed to certify or delayed unduly. 34
The new Rules have completely abolished this obsolete proce-
dure, and have substituted a procedure patterned on the Federal
Rules of Appellate Procedure. The appeal is taken by filing a
simple notice of appeal1 31 within ten days after entry of the judg-
ment or order appealed from.' 3 The time may be extended for an
additional period of not more than 20 days on a request made
before expiration (or after expiration, on a showing of excusable
neglect) provided the judgment or order does not authorize the sale
of any property.' 31
130. II U.S.C. § 55(b), (c).
131. Rules 801 to 814, inclusive.
132. I1 U.S.C. § 67(c). See note 13, supra.
133. AcT § 39(a)(8); II U.S.C. § 67(a)(8).
134. It had been suggested that the appropriate remedy was to apply to the judge for
an order in the nature of a writ of mandamus against the referee. See 2 COLLIER, 91 39.25
at 1510 and cases therein cited to the effect that if the petition were not certified by the
referee in a reasonable time, it could be dismissed for laches. Inordinate delay in certifica-
tion was by no means unusual in actual practice, and the remedy of mandamus was, for
obvious reasons, rarely invoked and highly ineffective.
135. Rule 801.
136. Rule 802(a). Cross-appeals may be filed within ten days after the first notice of
appeal or within the time otherwise prescribed by Rule 802, whichever last expires.
137. Rule 802(c), Ibid 249.
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Rule 802(b) like Rule 4(a) of the Federal Rules of Appeallate
Procedure, terminates the running of time for appeal on filing with
the referee any of the following motions: a motion for judgment
notwithstanding a verdict on a contested adjudication under Rule
115(b)(4);1 3s a motion to amend or make additional findings of
fact; or a motion for a new trial or to amend or alter the judgment
under Rule 923. As under present federal appellate practice, how-
ever, a petition for rehearing does not stay or affect the running
of the time for appeal.13 1
Procedure for supersedeas, 40 designation,' and transmittal4 2
of the record, and filing of briefs143 are basically similar to appeals
to a court of appeals except that time periods are generally shorter.
Parties are not required to furnish an appendix, and briefs need
not be printed or prepared in any prescribed format.
The parties are entitled to oral argument unless otherwise pro-
vided by local rules or court order.'
As under former General Order 47145 the referees' findings of
fact are to be accepted unless clearly erroneous-due regard must
be given to the opportunity of the referee to judge the credibility
of witnesses.'
The district court may, by local rule, suspend the Part VIII
rules dealing with transmittal of the record, filing of briefs, oral
argument and rehearing, but the basic provisions regarding per-
fecting the appeal and its disposition may not be altered.'
138. Through an apparent oversight, however, the rule does not refer to judgment n.o.v.
following a jury trial on a non-dischargeable debt or related proceeding covered by Rule
409(c). The Advisory Note to Rule 802 indicates most strongly that it was the Committee's
intent that such a motion be included. A clarifying amendment would be most desirable.
139. But see the recent decision of In re Penco Corp., - F.2d - CCH BKPrCY
SERV 64,555 (4th Cir. 1972) apparently holding to the contrary. This decision seems most
unsound since it rests on the authority of Pfister v. Northern Illinois Finance Co., 317 U.S.
144, 153 (1942), a case specifically abrogated by the 1970 amendments to § 39(c). See 2
COLLIER 1 39.01 at 1468.
140. Rule 805.
141. Rule 806.
142. Rule 807.
143. Rule 808.
144. Rule 809.
145. 11 U.S.C. § 53 et seq. Although General Order 47 referred to hearings on reports
of referees and special masters, its standards were generally held applicable to petitions for
review.
146. Rule 810. Cf. FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a).
147. Rule 814.
1973]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
PART IX
GENERAL PROVISIONS
Part IX'45 contains the definitions and general provisions which
apply throughout the Rules. Most of these rules are substantially
declaratory of existing practice. There are, however, one or two
innovations which are worthy of special note.
Rule 915 dealing with objections to summary jurisdiction of the
bankruptcy court'49 contains a highly desirable revision of former
law. Under the old procedure if objections to summary jurisdiction
were sustained the court had no alternative but to dismiss the
proceeding and the parties were then compelled to commence a
complete new plenary proceeding. Rule 915(b) now permits the
court, where federal plenary jurisdiction is present, 5 ° to transfer
the proceeding to the civil docket of the district court whereupon
it shall continue "as if filed as a civil action in the district court
on the date it was filed in the court of bankruptcy."
Rule 920 grants to the referee a limited power to punish con-
tempts without the necessity of certification to the judge.'"' Con-
tempts may be punished by the referee if actually committed in his
presence, and if the punishment is limited to a fine of not more
than $250.00. Imprisonment or a larger fine may be ordered only
by the judge on certification from the referee.
CONCLUSION
Viewed in their entirety, the new Rules represent a monumental
improvement in the administration of Bankruptcy proceedings.
Many of the promised reforms are long overdue; all represent the
results of ceaseless and devoted effort over a ten-year period of a
committee singularly well-equipped to formulate an efficient and
148. Rules 901-929.
149. See note 112, supra.
150. Federal Courts have plenary jurisdiction over proceedings instituted by trustees in
bankruptcy not only in all instances provided in the Judicial Code, such as diversity of
citizenship, federal question, etc. (28 U.S.C. §§ 331(ff)) but also in all cases involving
preferential or fraudulent transfers and in all cases where the defendant consents.
AcT § 23, 60, 67a, 70(e); I I U.S.C. §§ 46, 96, 107(a), 110(e).
151. Cf., AcT § 41(b); II U.S.C. § 69(b). This rule was bitterly criticized by Justice
Douglas in his dissent from the adoption of the Rules generally. He found it "alarming to
vest appointees of bankruptcy courts with the power to punish for contempt." With due
deference we might suggest that the fault, if any, lies with the statutory provisions for
appointment and not with the grant to judicial officers of a minimum degree of control of
the proceedings over which they preside.
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equitable mechanism to achieve the objectives of the Bankruptcy
Act.
The Committee and its staff are particularly to be commended
for their foresight in having solicited and considered the comments
and suggestions of the bench and bar. The final product, which
reflected many of these suggestions is worthy of enthusiastic sup-
port of the entire legal and commercial community.

